Garrigou-Lagrange de Eucharistia Qq. 73-82 - [PDF Document] (2024)

5/21/2018 Garrigou-Lagrange de Eucharistia Qq. 73-82

1/22

COMMENTS ON ST.THOMASS TEACHING ON THE EUCHARIST

AS FOUND IN SUMM A THEOLOGIAE III,QQ.73et seq.

fromDe Eucharistia et Poenitentiaby R. Garrigou-Lagrange, OP

translated Peter A. Kwasniewski for the students oftheInternational Theological Institute

Gaming, Austria, 2004

[Overview of ST III, q. 73]

|| p. 44 || Recapitulation of the method. St. Thomas in hisusual manner begins [the question]from a nominal definition of theEucharist; he then seeks its real definition in terms of genusand

specific difference. This he does under the light of revelation(1) through a conceptual and philo-sophical analysis, by dividingthe genus of sacrament, and (2) inductively from thingsrevealed,

by seeking the specific definition of the Eucharist, before hedraws theological conclusions.

If therefore in this first question [of the treatise] there aresyllogisms or discursive arguments,they are solely explicativearguments, or rather, they are more arguments subjectivelyillative, notarguments objectively illative, which [sort] wouldarrive at new truth that is only virtually con-

tained in revealed truths. A subjectively illative argumentshows only that such-and-such an ex-plicit formula is equivalent toanother that is less explicit but of the same truth, e.g., that theasser-

tion of the infallibility of the supreme pontiff speaking excathedra is equivalent to the assertionof Christ himself: You arePeter, and upon this rock I will build my Church, and the gates ofhellshall not prevail against it.

In this way St. Thomas proceeds in our question 73: it is atheological inquiry into the definitionof the Eucharist, and anexplanation of its necessity, which are things already formallyrevealed.

And so, in article 1 it is shown, not properly deduced, that theEucharist is a sacrament (this is the

genus in its definition), and it is spiritual food (thus ispointed out its specific difference).

In article 2, it is shown that the Eucharist is one kind ofsacrament, although it be materiallydouble; the reason is that itis ordered to something one, namely spiritual nourishment[refectio-nem]. Thus no new truth or new proposition is drawn fromrevelation. He explains only why

Councils always speak of the Eucharist as of just one sacramentand not as two, and why wespeak in the singular of the most holySacrament.

In article 3, nothing is properly deduced; explanation is given[only] of the necessity of the Eu-

charist revealed by Christ the Lord in these words: Unless youshall eat of the flesh of the Son ofMan, you shall not have lifewithin you. || p. 45 || This is explained through a conceptualanaly-sis: the Eucharist is necessary for salvation, non in reality[in re], because it does not grant the

first grace, but in desire (at least implicitly), since thefirst grace essentially tends toward its con-summation, which isgiven through this sacrament.

In article 4 is treated the reason why the Eucharist is namedwith different names with respect topast, present, and future.There is no deduction of new truth, but an explanation of namesfoundin Sacred Scripture.

Again, in article 5 the fittingness of the institution isexplained.

5/21/2018 Garrigou-Lagrange de Eucharistia Qq. 73-82

2/22

Finally, in article 6 the [Old Testament] figures of theEucharist are enumerated, and the foremostamong them is pointedout.

Therefore up to this point, there has been no objectivelyillative argument, no theological conclu-

sion properly speaking, but only an explanation of revealedtruth. And it should be noted that thispart of sacred theology,analytical so to speak, is of great moment; indeed, it is superiorto the

deduction of a new theological conclusion, for through thisanalysis or explanatory argumentationis properly obtained a certainunderstanding of the very mysteries, that is, of the verystarting-

points of faith, which exceedingly surpass theologicalconclusions, just as the infused habit ofsupernatural faith, as faras its substance goes, exceedingly surpasses the habit of theologyac-quired by human effort. Infused faith is much higher than sacredtheology which proceeds from

it, although faith together with theology is somethingextensively more perfect than faith withouttheology. I sayextensively, not intensively, because a great contemplative who isignorant of

theological conclusions but, with a great spirit of faith and bythe gift of understanding, has pene-trated deeply into themysteries of faith, ranks higher than a theologian who knows toperfectiontheological conclusions about some mystery, yet haspenetrated less intensely into that mystery

itself.

* * *

[On ST III, q. 75, a. 1]

|| p. 81 || These reasons of fittingness [on behalf of the realpresence of Christ in the Eucharist]may, in addition, be elucidatedby a higher principle by which also are elucidated the mysteriesof

the most Holy Trinity and of the redemptive Incarnation, ofwhich mysteries the Eucharist is theoutward radiation[irradiatio].

Now this principle is stated by St. Thomas at the beginning ofhis treatise on the Incarnation, III,

q. 1, a. 1, under this form: It pertains to the nature of thegood that it communicate itself to oth-ers; hence it pertains tothe nature of the highest good that it communicate itself in thehighest

way. From this principle of the diffusion of the good themystery of the most Holy Trinity iselucidated in ScG IV, c. 11.There it is shown that it befits God, the highest good, first tocom-municate himself in the highest way ad intra,by communicatinghis whole nature by generating

the eternal Son and by breathing forth the Holy Spirit. By thesame principle is shown the fit-tingness of the Incarnation,namely, that God communicate himself in the highest way to thecrea-

ture in the Person of his Son, made flesh for our redemption.Finally, by the same principle ismanifested the fittingness of theEucharist, namely since the good is essentially diffusive ofitself,Christ wanted to give himself to us as food [seipsum nobisdare ut alimentum] and at the same

time as a victim sacramentally offered until the end of theworld. In this way, the author of graceand of salvation wouldremain present to us.

By the same principle is manifested, in the communication of thehighest good ad intra, the inti-

mate communion of the three divine Persons, which is the supremeexemplar of eucharistic com-

munion and of the communion of the faithful among themselves,according to that prayer of Chr-ist to his Father: That they may beone, just as we are one, namely, that they be one in faith,hope,charity, through eucharistic communion at the same banquet, just aswe are one in nature.

Again, the arguments of fittingness for the real presence may befortified by looking at it, on ourpart, with respect to the threetheological virtues, as St. Thomas does to show the fittingnessofthe Incarnation in III, q. 1, a. 2.

5/21/2018 Garrigou-Lagrange de Eucharistia Qq. 73-82

3/22

And indeed, through the real presence our faith is confirmed,whose motive is the authority ofGod revealing; for in theEucharist, the Word incarnatereally present and, by his savinginflu-

ence, believed indaily confirms what that he once upon a timesaid in his preaching. In thisway, in the Eucharist he remains asthe Teacher of the secrets of divine union. He is presenttoilluminate and draw us after him.

Equally, the real presence fortifies our hope, whose motive isGod helping, because it is the pres-ence not only of grace but alsoof the very author of grace. If, however, God gives us his Sonin

such wise that he continually remains with us even to the end ofthe world, he will not refuse theleast thing necessary forsalvation. If he gives us the Eucharist, a fortiori he will give usthe ac-tual graces that we ask with a view to persevering.

|| p. 82 || Finally, the real presence inflames charity towardsGod and neighbor on account of so

great a manifestation of the love of Christ, by virtue of whichhe has bent down to live with us asa companion of our exile, andgives himself at once as victim and food [sese dedit simul uthos-

tiam et cibum], that we may be more and more incorporated intohim. Charity towards onesneighbor is likewise inflamed by this,inasmuch as everyonethe rich and the poor, the learnedand thesimpleought to unite in this heavenly banquet and be nourished bythe same Savior,

Christ. In this way are united the members of any and everyfamily, so too diverse classes of thesame people, so too diverseChristian peoples, as is plainly the case in the greatinternational eu-

charistic congresses.

* * *

[On ST III, q. 75, a. 1, obj. 1 & ad 1]

|| p. 82 || The first objection is laid down by St. Thomas (asthe third objection of the first article),to wit: No body can besimultaneously in many places. But the true body of Christ is inheaven.

Therefore it cannot really be in the Eucharist.

To this the response is made: the body of Christ is in theEucharist not as in a place, or circum-

scriptively, but by a special manner, i.e., || p. 83 ||sacramentally, as will be explained below, q.76, aa. 35, namely inthe manner of substance.

Before we come to explaining those articles of q. 76, it isfitting, for the sake of a fuller solutionof this objection, to saythat something can be in a place in three ways, namely,circ*mscriptively,definitively, and sacramentally. Thus the Councilof Trent, session 13, chapter 1.

circ*mscriptively, namely by reason of quantity

something is in place definitively, in such a waythat it maynotbe elsewhere

non-circ*mscriptively

sacramentally, in such a waythat it may alsobe elsewhere

Something is in place circ*mscriptively, when it is in it byreason of quantity, in such a waythat the whole is in the wholeplace and the single parts are in the single parts of the place.Thisis the way our body is here and now in its place. So, too, isthe glorious body of Christ now in

5/21/2018 Garrigou-Lagrange de Eucharistia Qq. 73-82

4/22

heaven. Something is in place non-circ*mscriptively, or not asin a place, when it is in it, notby reason of quantity, but byreason of substance or even by reason of power; then the whole isin

the whole place and the whole is in each and every part of theplace. Now this can occur in twoways: either definitively orsacramentally.

Definitively, in such a way that it may not be elsewhere; thisis the way our soul is in our body,

the soul of a brute animal in its body, the vegetative soul of aplant in the plant itself; the essenceof bread under its quantityis whole in the whole and whole in each and every part, and notelse-

where. These things are in place, not as in a place, but in themanner of substance [haec sunt inloco, non sicut in loco, sed permodum substantiae]. An angel is in place through its powerinas-much as it acts upon a body, and is not elsewhere [for as longas it is so acting].

Sacramentally something is in place, in such a way that it mayalso be elsewhere. This is the

way the body of Christ is in this consecrated host, the whole isin it, and the whole is in each andevery part of it, as was [thecase with] the substance of bread, and is simultaneouslyelsewhere,

namely in heaven and in other consecrated hosts.

|| p. 84 || . . . [T]he body of Christ is present in theEucharist non-circ*mscriptively, but through

the manner of substance. Thus only the sacramental appearancesare truly distant from heaven,and are divided among themselvesinasmuch as certain appearances are in Rome and others inJerusalemor other places. But in all these places is one and the same bodyof Christ through themanner of substance, beyond the spatial orquantitative order, as will be shown below in q. 76.

In other words, the body of Christ in heaven is not distantaccording to entity or substance from

the body of Christ which is in this consecrated host. What isimpossible is that the body of Christbe simultaneouslycirc*mscriptively in two different places, because in that case itwould be in

these two places in the manner of quantity, and its quantitywould be divided from itself.

. . . Objection: A figure cannot be without quantity locallyextended. And yet the body of Christcannot be without a figure, forthus it would no more be the body of a man than that of a lambor

of a dove. Therefore the body of Christ cannot be in theEucharist without quantity locally ex-tended.

In response: I distinguish the major premise: [if referring to]a figure extended or taken in termsof the order of parts withrespect to place, I concede the argument; figure taken for theorder of

parts among themselves with respect to substance, I deny,shifting the burden of proof to adversa-ries. I distinguish theminor premise in the same way, and I deny what follows from theargu-

ment. Thus, in the Eucharist the head of Christ is not hisheart, on the contrary it is outside hisheart, with respect tosubstance, not with respect to place. For the quantity of Christ(cf. below, q.76, a. 4) is present only by reason oftransubstantiation and therefore in the manner of substance,

not in the manner of quantity locally extended. Indeed these[sorts of arguments] conquer theimagination because the imaginationand also geometry do not transcend the continuum; but the

imagination is to be corrected in through faith and reason.

Such objections seem clearer than the response given them. Thisis because they are taken up inaccordance with the exceedinglysuperficial and imperfect manner of our knowledge, a manner

quite material and quantitative, while the response is takenfrom the lofty height of the mystery tobe explained and presupposea subtle distinction, which is not immediately perfectlyunderstood,but only with maturity of intelligence and by a profoundinquiry.

* * *

5/21/2018 Garrigou-Lagrange de Eucharistia Qq. 73-82

5/22

[On ST III, q. 75, a. 4]

|| p. 99 || Status of the question: More directly now is to beconsidered transubstantiation itself.From the foregoing articles itis apparent that this conversion is necessary for the real presence[to

come to be], as was admitted by Tradition, but difficultiesremain concerning the intrinsic possi-bility of such a conversionconsidered in itself.

The first difficulty stated at the start of the article is takenfrom the principle of change, viz., in

every change there has to be some subject, which stands firstone way, then another way [aliter etaliter se habeat]. And yet theconversion of bread into the body of Christ would be achangewithout a subject changed over [subjecto transmutato], forthe whole substance of bread would beconverted, even its matter.Therefore this seems repugnant [to reason].

The reason for this difficulty is that the principle of change,every change supposes a subjectchanged over, seems to have the samenecessity and universality as the principle of efficient

causality, nothing comes to be without a cause, and theprinciple of finality: every agent actsfor the sake of an end.However, a miracle can be beyond the physical laws of nature, yetnot

beyond metaphysical principles; for neither can something bedone miraculously without a cause,

nor can an agent act without any purpose, and therefore,likewise, [it seems that] neither can achange be done miraculouslywithout a subject changed over, which stands differently now thanitdid before.

To solve this difficulty, as we shall see, it has to beconsidered that cause in common is not saidunivocally butanalogously of agent, of end, of form, and of matter, and that God,supreme agent

and end, cannot be a material or formal cause of things. Fromthis it will become clear that nei-ther is || p. 100 || necessityfound univocally, but analogously, in the aforesaid principles ofeffi-

cient causality, finality, and change. But St. Thomas hasformulated this difficulty best of all, andhe, as we shall see,lucidly solves it.

Two other difficulties are just as pressing:

The second: Nor can it be said that the form of the body ofChrist begins newly to be in the matterof bread. For this matterdoes not remain. Therefore this conversion seems to have nolikeness atall to natural conversion; and therefore it isunintelligible [unthinkable].

The third: Nor can the matter of bread be converted into thematter of the body of Christ. For ofthings which are diverse inthemselves, one of them can never become the other, forexample,never can white be black; but thesubject of white canbecome thesubject of black. And yet twosignate matters are diversein themselves, as principles of individuation. Therefore thismatter of

bread cannot become this matter of the body of Christ, withoutany subject remaining.

Nevertheless, the response is: The whole substance of bread isconverted into the whole substanceof the body of Christ, and hence,this conversion is appropriately called transubsta ntiation.

[1. This can be proved from the authority of the Councils citedabove, especially the Council of

Trent. . . .]

2. In the body of the article St. Thomas makes manifest, in acertain way, the possibility of such aconversion; at very least, heshows that its possibility cannot be denied.

The argument may be reduced to this:

5/21/2018 Garrigou-Lagrange de Eucharistia Qq. 73-82

6/22

Every agent acts in so far as it is in act, inasmuch as actingfollows being and the mode of act-ing follows the mode ofbeing.

But God is infinite act.

Therefore God can act not only up to the limit of the effect[spower to act], i.e., the cha nging

of a form in some remaining subject, but also [can bring about]the conversion|| p. 101 || of the whole being, so that the wholesubstance of this is converted into the whole sub-

stance of that.

Briefly: God, and God alone, has immediate power over being asbeing, to the extent of produc-ing being through creation (cf. STI, q. 45, a. 5) and to the extent of immediately changing it [a

things being] through transubstantiation.

Compare the response to the third objection: By the power of aninfinite agent (which has actionon the whole being) such aconversion can happen, because both forms and both matters are

common to the nature of being; and that which is of entity inone (i.e., essence, subsistence, andexistence) the Author of beingcan convert into that which is of entity in the other, withthat

through which they were distinguished being taken away. Thus theAuthor of being can tran-substantiate a stone into bread, a wolfinto a sheep, a sheep into an angelthough not, as will besaidbelow, an angel into God.

Many dubia remain concerning this demonstration, and it isbetter to examine them before pro-

ceeding to the replies to the objections. 1. Is it certain andevident that God alone can immediate-ly change being qua being? 2.Has St. Thomas properly demonstrated that God cantransubstan-tiate, or has he only offered a persuasive argument? 3.Whether the possibility of transubstantia-

tion, as with the possibility of the Trinity, cannot bepositively demonstrated by reason alone?

[Dubium 1. . . .]

Dubium 2. This possibility is at least persuasively argued bySt. Thomas, and at the same time he

shows that this possibility cannot be disproved. For how couldthe Author of being not be able toconvert the whole entity of anycreated substance into any other created substance, even astoneinto an angel? The only thing that is really impossible isthat God should convert a created sub-

stance into himself, into deity, since it cannot be said thatGod himself is from bread or fromany other substance changed intohim, because if that were true God would depend in a certainwayupon that substance.

What is more, it is evident enough that transubstantiation caneither be productive of a new sub-stance or non-productive if itoccurs with regard to a pre-existent substance, as bread isconvertedinto the pre-existent body of Christ. And on account ofdifficulties to be considered below, which

remain by reason of this pre-existence of the body of Christ,the argument of St. Thomas perhapsmore persuades us of thepossibility of transubstantiation than it positively demonstratesit. || p.

103 || At least, from this argument we gather thantransubstantiation cannot be called impossible.That is, itspossibility is proved at least negatively, in that, supposingdivine omnipotence, onecannot prove transubstantiationimpossible.

Dubium 3. It does not seem repugnant [to say that thepossibility of transubstantiation might be

positively proved] because transubstantiation is only a miracleof the highest order, it is not prop-erly speaking a mysteryessentially supernatural, since it does not pertain immediately tothe in-timate life of God, nor to the participation thereof,differing in that way from the mystery of theTrinity, theIncarnation, the life of grace and of glory. God, as author ofnature, just as he can

5/21/2018 Garrigou-Lagrange de Eucharistia Qq. 73-82

7/22

create or produce being qua being, can equally transubstantiatethe substance of wood into thesubstance of gold. For thisproduction it is not required that God intervene as author of graceand

glory; it suffices that he intervene as author and dominator ofnature. Whence it does not seemrepugnant that the possibility oftransubstantiation be positively proved . . . .

It should be noticed that St. Thomas says, in IV Sent. d. 2, q.1, a. 3, that the Incarnation, and

even creation, are worthier [dignior] than transubstantiation.The assumption of human naturehas its terminus in the Person of theSon of God, which [Person] is worthier than the body of Chr-

ist, which is the terminus of transubstantiation. In addition,creation is indicative of greaterpower than transubstantiation,because, simply speaking, non-being stands further from beingthanthisbeing stands from thatbeing. Nevertheless, he says in ST III,q. 75, a. 8, ad 3: In this

conversion (of bread into Christs body) there are many moredifficu lties (for our understanding)than in creation, i.e., nonmerely the total conversion of the substance of bread, but also thecon-

tinued existence [permanentia] of its accidents, and the factthat, e.g., we can even be nourishedby them (cf. q. 77, aa. 3, 5,6). The question of transubstantiation is much more complicatedthanthe question of creation.

|| p. 108 || . . .Final dubium [7]. What is the relationshipbetween St. Thomass teaching on tran-

substantiation and the metaphysical principles formulated byhim?

As will have been clear from the solution to Scotussobjections,1the Thomistic teaching on tran-substantiation isconnected with (1) the teaching on being as analogically common toall beings;

(2) the teaching on substance as first-created, according towhich substance has a claim on beingin and of itself [jus ad esseper se], although it is not its own being [esse] but reallydistinguishedfrom it, (3) the teaching on accidents as reallydistinct from substance, and their having in them-selves anaptitude for being-in-another, in such wise nevertheless that theiressence is really dis-tinct from their being or better yet, theirin-being or actual inherence; (4) the teaching on relation,

according to which relation cannot be produced without afoundation, and which relation is notmutual if the extremes are notof the same order, e.g., the creature is really related to the Crea-

tor, but the Creator is not really related to the creatures (cf.ST I, q. 13, a. 7).

* * *

Recapitulation of q. 75, aa. 14

St. Thomas has therefore most excellently organized the firstarticles of this question.

In article 1, he explained the words of revelation concerningthe real presence, and gave argu-ments of fittingness.

In article 2, he shows that the substance of bread does notremain after consecration, not only

since the real presence of the body of Christ cannot begin to beexcept by a conversion of the sub-stance of bread into itself, asTradition says, but also because the words of consecration wouldbe

false on any other account.

In article 3, he proves from the aforesaid that the substance ofbread is not annihilated,becausethat which is converted intoanother is not annihilated, and again he affirms that the body ofChr-ist cannot become really present except by the conversion ofbread into itself.

1not translated here

5/21/2018 Garrigou-Lagrange de Eucharistia Qq. 73-82

8/22

In article 4, he returns to the conclusion of the precedingarticles, and shows that the possibility oftransubstantiationcannot be disproved, or more correctly, he at least offers apersuasive argu-

ment in its favor, because the author of being has immediatepower over the being, as being, ofany creature, and hence is ableto convert that thing into the substance of another thing.

In such a way, the body of Christ, preexisting in heaven, islike the summit at which are cease-

lessly converging all the transubstantiations of thecelebrations of Mass; it is like the peak of apyramid, remaining initself immovable, toward which new lines extended from thepyramids

base have their term; or like the abiding sun, in which new actsof human sight have their term.For the preexisting body of Christis not physically changed by the innumerable transubstantia-tionswhich are multiplied in time and have their term in Him.2

* * *

Response to phenomenalism

|| p. 116 || The response to the second objection3should beattentively explained, because here the

question arises: Why [Quaenam] is the notion of substancealtogether necessary for preserving

the dogma of transubstantiation and the real presence? Fourmodern difficulties can be proposed:

1. Whether the notion of substance is sufficient which is hadfrom ordinary experience [a sensu

communi], or from natural reason, and which corresponds to thenominal definition, namely whatthis name (insofar as equivalentsfor it are found in all languages) means for men of all races.

2. Whether a more philosophical notion of substance is required[for the doctrine].

3. Whether the notion of substance proposed by nominalists andempiricists is insufficient, name-

ly, a collection of phenomena4to which is adjoined a name incommon, substance? Or rather,whether such a notion is repugnant tothe doctrine.

4. Whether the notion of substance proposed by the subjectivistconceptualists, such as Kant, is

insufficient, namely, that substance is a subjective category ofour mind, without real value [va-lore reali].

Cf. Denz. 2025: This proposition of the Modernists is condemned:Dogmas of the faith are to be

retained only according to a practical sense, that is, asinstructive norms of action, but not asnorms of belief.

. . . || p. 117 || [T]o solve objections the common-sense notionof substance often does not suffice,and thus we need to explain it,passing over to the status of acquiring a distinct conceptthereof.

This is certainly the mind of St. Thomas, who, like Aristotle,always passes from a nominal defi-nition (even if he does notexpressly talk about it) or a confused concept, to a distinct one.And

Aristotle accordingly gives high praise to Socrates for thisreason, that he was always searching

out definitions (cf.Metaphysics I, c. 6).

2Cf. also Jeremys footnote to q. 76, a. 5; the exchange ofletters between Holmes and Kwasniewski; M.-J.

Nicolas, OP, What is the Eucharist?, 5355.3[Which was: There isno deception in this sacrament; for the accidents are thereaccording to the truth of

the reality, which accidents are discerned by the senses. Andthe intellect, whose proper object is sub-

stance, as is said in book 3 ofDe Anima, is preserved fromdeception by faith.]4[Or, in Bertrand Russells phrase, a bundle ofevents]

5/21/2018 Garrigou-Lagrange de Eucharistia Qq. 73-82

9/22

What, therefore, is the common notion of substance, and how maya transition be made from thisconfused notion to the same, asdistinct? In this we have an example of the development of dog-

ma.

Commonly, the name substance designates any being subsistingperse or in se, which is knownby its various properties. Thus all mensay that a stone, iron, gold, bread are substances and, at

least in a confused way, they thus distinguish substance fromits sensible qualities. This notion,after the manner of a nominaldefinition, is found in any ordinary vocabulary, for in it [suchvo-

cabulary] the explanation of the name is its nominal definition,namely, what men commonlymean when they use this word or noun.Common-sense or natural reason does not yet affirm, forexample,that the substance of bread is whole in the whole bread and wholein each part of it, but

if this is affirmed by some philosopher, common-sense does notdeny it; on the contrary, in a cer-tain way it understandsthis.

However, a transition from the nominal definition or confusedconcept to a distinct concept in a

definition expressive of the real can be done either rightly andmethodically, or without methodand even at times arriving at afalse definition. It is done methodically through the correctdivi-sion of being into categories or genera, and through aprogressive division of the highest genera,

and also by comparing what is to be defined with other thingslike and unlike it. Or this transitionfrom the nominal definitionto another more explicit one is done without method and arrivesat

times at a false definition, which does not cohere with thenominal definition considered before.

How does St. Thomas pass from a confused concept of substance toa distinct one? He says inthe reply to the second objection

5of our article, following Aristotle inDe Anima III, ch. 6(lect.

11): The proper object of the intellect is substance, namely,the substantial being of sensiblethings. And indeed, being as beingis not somethingper se sensible, it is not extended, nor white,norblack, nor hot; it is therefore notper se knowable by the senses,neither as a common sensible

such as magnitude, nor as a proper sensible like color or sound.Being is notper se sensible, butper se intelligible, or rather, isthat by reason of which everything in sensible things becomesin-

telligible. Whence this can be understood by all, namely, everybeing [omne ens] (of which it

may be properly said, not only by which something isbut what itis) is one and the same un-der its various and successivephenomena, e.g., under || p. 118 || its qualities whetherpermanent

or variable, under its actions, passions, relations, etc. Andthis being, one and the same undervarious phenomena, is called incommon substance or being existing in itself [ens in se exis-

tens], thus preserving and explaining the nominal definition ofsubstance. What is more, fromthis follows the principle ofsubstance,namely: Everything WHICHproperly is, is a substance,whilean accident is that BY WHICH something is white or hot, etc. [omnequodproprie est, est

substantia, accidens est quo aliquid est album aut calidumetc.].

Hence, the notion of substance is nothing other than a certainnew determination of the notion ofbeing, and the principle ofsubstance likewise is a new determination of the principle ofidentity:

being is being, non-being is non-being. From this it followsthat every being is one and thesame under its phenomena, if it hasphenomena. I say if it has sensible phenomena, because

there can be a substance which is altogether above the sensibleorder, that is, a substance simplyspiritual, as God and angel.

* * *

5[quoted in an earlier footnote]

5/21/2018 Garrigou-Lagrange de Eucharistia Qq. 73-82

10/22

[On ST III, q. 75, a. 8]

. . . || p. 126 || In the body of the article, to show the truthof this proposition [Out of bread, thebody of Christ comes to be]and other similar ones, as well as to exclude false propositions,St.

Thomas articulates principles by comparing transubstantiationwith creation and with [natural]generation. Thus by a comparativeinduction the hunt for a definition of transubstantiation is

brought to its close.

In the body of the article, the comparison betweentransubstantiation, creation, and natural changeis expressed asfollows:

(a) In all three it is true that after this there is that, andthese two are not simultaneous, but there

is a succession of terms. The body of Christ is after the bread,in transubstantiation; fire is afterair, in change; being is afternon-being, in creation.

(b) In transubstantiation and in creation, there is not somesubject common to both extremes; the

contrary is true for natural changes.

(c) In transubstantiation and in natural change: (i) one of theextremes passes over into the other,while on the contrary increation, non-being is not converted into being; (ii) intransubstantiationand in natural change something remains the same,but in a change, this same thing is the matter,

whereas in transubstantiation it is the accidents.

* * *

[On ST III, q. 76, a. 2, ad 1]

|| p. 134 || The second consecration is not superfluous, first,because this is helpful forrepresenting Christs Passion, in whichthe blood and the body were separated. Hence also in the

form of the consecration of the blood, its being poured out ismentioned. This reason is fore-most, namely, the twofoldconsecration is required for the Eucharist as the sacrificeinstituted by

Christ, that, namely, it be a sacramental or unbloody immolationwhich represents the bloodyimmolation of Calvary, as the Council ofTrent teaches (Denz. 940). We shall see below that the

sacrifice of the Mass is a true sacrifice, although in it theimmolation is only sacramental. Thereason is that in sacrifice ingeneral, while the internal sacrifice is in the genus of moralaction,the external sacrifice or that which is done concerning thereal victim offered up, is in the genus

of sign, namely as a sign of an interior offering up, a signalso of confessing the supreme domi-nion of God over all thingsincluding exterior ones, a sign of making reparation for the debtin-

curred by sin. Thus in the sacrifice of the Mass the blood ofChrist is poured out, not really andphysically, but sacramentallyor mystically. Nevertheless, this sacramental immolation ofChristthe Savior himself, as far as the nature of a sign isconcerned, expresses the interior, reparatory

offering up and the supreme dominion of God, Lord of life anddeath, much more than the bloodyimmolations of all the victims ofthe Old Testament.

* * *

[On q. 76, a. 3]

|| p. 136 || His argument, in which the major, as is frequentlythe case, is enunciated after the mi-

nor, may be thus reduced to syllogistic form:

5/21/2018 Garrigou-Lagrange de Eucharistia Qq. 73-82

11/22

The nature of a substance is whole under each and every part ofits dimensions, even whenthere is as yet no separation.

However, the body of Christ is present in the Eucharist, not inthe manner of quantity, but in

the manner of substance, by reason of transubstantiation, whichis produced by the force of thewords, but withouttransaccidentation.

Therefore the body of Christ is whole under each and every partof the appearances, even

when there is as yet no separation.

The major is clear already according to natural reason, e.g.,the whole nature of bread is alreadyunder each and every part ofit, even before separation. For substance, which is notsomething

per se sensible, but which isper se intelligible, is not ofitself extended,but is something loftierthan the extension that isof itself sensible. Nor is substance a lone indivisible point,because a

point has a location in the continuum, as its term. Substancepertains to a higher order. It is said

to be something more profound or more internal, if a sensibleaccident be considered as some-thing external; it is said to besomething higher, if an accident be considered as somethinglower,

as pertainingper se to the sensible order. Thus substance isthat by which each and every being

of which it can be properly said that it isis one and the sameunder its various phenomena.Hence, the nature of substance is wholein the whole and whole in each and every part, e.g., thenature ofgold or radium is, in the least part of it, the same costly metal,even before the separa-tion of part from part.

The minor is certain from things said before, namely the body ofChrist is in the Eucharist, not in

the manner of quantity, because there was not atransaccidentation of the accidents of breadinto the accidents ofthe body of Christ, but solely a transubstantiation, by reason ofwhich this

body is present, as was said. If therefore the quantity of thebody of Christ is also present, it isnot by the force of the words,but solely by concomitance, and so, as will be said in thefollowingarticle, [it is present] not in virtue of itself but invirtue of the substance, and according to its rela-

tion to substance, which alone is [made to be] present in virtueof itself, by the force of the words.

Therefore the whole body of Christ is under each and every partof the host, even before separa-tion.

* * *

[On q. 76, a. 4: Is the whole dimensive quantity of Christs bodyin this sacrament?]

|| p. 138 || Status of the question. It seems that the wholedimensive quantity of the body of Chr-ist is not in this sacrament,(1) because the whole quantity of the body of Christ cannot beunder

the least particle of the consecrated host, (2) because thedimensive quantity of bread remains inthis sacrament, and twodimensive quantities cannot be simultaneously in the same place;they

would be identical, and no longer two, (3) because the dimensivequantity of the body of Christ ismuch more than the extension ofthe host, thus it would extend beyond it [were it reallypresent].

Nevertheless, the response is affirmative, namely, the wholequantity of the body of Christ is un-der this sacrament; which, atfirst sight, seems unbelievable, but which is not repugnant toreasonif it be well understood that such quantity is under thesacrament concomitantly. 6

6I.e., not in the manner properly its own as an accident, but ina foreign manner, namely that of the sub-

stance that has the accident. Garrigous subsequent remarks onJohn of St. Thomass proof that this must

be the case are worth reading, pp. 13940. (Trans.)

5/21/2018 Garrigou-Lagrange de Eucharistia Qq. 73-82

12/22

|| p. 140 || The first objection was: No dimensive quantity canbe whole in each and every part ofwhat contains that quantity;however this would be the case here; therefore it is impossible.In

response, I distinguish the major: that no dimensive quantitypresent in virtue of itself and accord-ing to its proper manner canbe whole, etc., I concede; but that it cannot if present in virtueofsubstance and in the manner of substance, I deny; and I make adistinction in the minor. That isto say, the dimensive quantity ofthe body of Christ is present in the Eucharist, not in virtue ofa

transaccidentation, but in virtue of transubstantiation, andtherefore solely by concomitance; i.e.,according to therelationship that it has to substance, and not according to therelationship that ithas to place.

To the second objection: That two dimensive quantities cannot benaturally in the same place, in

such a way that both be there according to the proper manner ofdimensive quantity, I concede.But in this sacrament, it is not thisway; for in it the presence of the body of Christ is notnatural,

but miraculous.7

|| p. 144 || According to Thomists and many others, bodilysubstance [as such] does not have dis-tinct and actual integralparts, but is composed solely of matter and form, anddemands8radicali-terqualities and operative faculties by reason ofform, quantity and material passivities by reason

of matter. That is, these accidents are accidents of thecomposite, but follow upon the compositeeither on the part of formor on the part of matter, insofar as they bear a likeness either toform, as

qualities do, or to matter, as quantity does. Hence, an actualdistinction of integral parts, e.g., ofthe head and the heart, isnot had from the substance itself, but from its quantity. This isquanti-tys first function, namely to distinguish parts amongthemselves, such that one is not another,

and to distinguish their order with respect to the whole. Beforequantity, indeed, there is alreadythe wholesubstantial entity ofthe parts; but it is quantity that constitutes the integral partsin their

formality asparts, making them to be distinct among themselves,such that one is not the other,and no one is the whole itself.

This is the first function of quantity, by the force of whichthe parts of a human body are distinct.

And the second effect of quantity is that these parts are spreadout with a view to being-in-place

[extensae in ordine ad locum]. Thomists add: The spreading-outof parts with a view to being-in-place presupposes a certaindistinction of parts, for something indivisible cannot be spreadout in

place, in it there is no capacity for spreading-out in place. Anangel cannot be spread out in place,nor a substantial form of anybody, nor prime matter. In addition, this at any rate issupported

indirectly by experience, e.g., in the development of an embryo,in which first are distinguishedbodily parts, e.g., the rudimentsof the heart and the rudiments of the brain, and afterwards theyareenlarged with regard to their place [they grow bigger, taking upmore of a place]. Again, a

microscope enlarges before our eyes, as if locally, things inthe least parts of the body, which arescarcely visible without suchan instrument; yet nevertheless a microscope could not thusenlarge

7That is, there is no competition between one dimensive quantityin itsplace, and another in itsplace,

such that the one would crowd out the other. The dimensivequantity of the bread remains as in a place

(though it does so miraculously, having no natural subject, thatis, substance, to give it being), while thedimensive quantity ofthe body of Christ is there not as in a place, because only thesubstance is present in

its proper mode (modus substantiae), without any of thatsubstances accidental modifications. These acci-

dental modificationsthe size, shape, weight, color, etc. of thebody of Jesusare present by concomit-

ance, which in this case means: in a manner foreign to their ownnatural or physical manner of existing,

which they have in one and only one place, namely, in heavenwhere the (glorified) body of Jesus has its

true and proper place from the time of the Ascension to theSecond Coming.8The verb is exigit,but I cant quite make sense ofthe phrase. The meaning seems to be: bodily substance

is in itself composed of matter and form, and all its materialand formal aspects or activities (e.g., its quanti-

ty, its active and passive powers) flow out from it as from ametaphysical root.

5/21/2018 Garrigou-Lagrange de Eucharistia Qq. 73-82

13/22

as if locally something that would be properly indivisible andnot have any distinct parts. Theseanimadversions are only of aremote analogy, but they show that spreading-out of parts witha

view to being-in-place presupposes a certain distinction ofparts; but something indivisible cannotbe spread out in place, asthe substantial form of any body, which surpasses the order of thecon-tinuous [i.e., bodies] and is invisible even with a microscope,since it is apprehended only by theintellect on meeting with asensible thing,9as is the formative law [lex genetica] of anembryo,

which is as if the governing idea in the embryo itself.10 Hence,this distinction of the two func-tions of quantity is not arbitraryor without foundation.

. . . || p. 145 || Now, Thomists apply the above teaching onquantity to the Eucharist in the follow-ing way.

The quantity of the body of Christ is in this sacrament asextensive of parts among themselves

and in relation to the whole, so that, namely, the heart isdistinguished from the head, but thisquantity is not present asextensive of parts with a view to being-in-place. How? Because itis

there, not by the force of the words, but solely byconcomitance, i.e., not by reason of itself, noraccording to themanner proper to it, but by reason of the substance to which it isjoined, and inthe manner of substance, namely, so that it is wholein the whole and whole in each and every

part, non part in a part. It ultimately comes to this: thequantity of the body of Christ is present bytransubstantiation.Neither does this imply a contradiction, for the spreading-out ofparts with a

view to place is thesecondary effect of quantity, and, as St.Thomas said in art. 3, ad 2: such dis-tance of parts is indeed inChrists true body itself, but it is not related to this sacramentaccordingto this distance, but according to the manner of itssubstance.

|| p. 146 || Thus is explained the fact that the body of Christis in the Eucharist not circ*mscrip-tively, not definitively as thesoul which is in its body and nowhere else, but sacramentally,insuch a way that it can be simultaneously numerically the same inheaven.

. . . For sound theological knowledge, the terminology employedby St. Thomas in our article suf-

fices, namely, that the dimensive quantity of the body of Christis in this sacrament, not according

to its proper manner (i.e., not circ*mscriptively, according toits relation to place, as the next ar-ticle puts it more nicely),but in the manner of substance (i.e., according to its relation tothe sub-stance to which it is really conjoined). This terminologysuffices, and in such supremely difficultmatters it is necessary tohave a taste for sobriety, for to wish to explain too much leads tospe-

cious subtleties, to acribology, as Aristotle said, which drawsone away from the contemplation ofmysteries. . . . || p. 147 || St.Thomas, who generally corrected his manuscripts in the directionof

abbreviating them rather than expanding them, kept this sobrietyin an extraordinary way, morethan many of his commentators, whosometimes want to go into an excessive explanation of histeaching,not tending enough toward the contemplation of higher things.Commentary on thedoctrine of St. Thomas, even if it is very fine,stands like a polygon inscribed in the circumfe-rence of a circle,which is a much simpler and more beautiful figure. St. Thomassteaching it-

self, moreover, is like a polygon inscribed in the yet higherand more beautiful circle of the Gos-pels or the teaching of thefaith. Hence one must not confuse the vulgarization oftheological

knowledge which is beneath this science, whose substance itfrequently does not preserve, andtrue Christian contemplation,which ascends above theology to the kernel [medullam] of theGos-

pel, of divine revelation.

* * *

9? nonnisi per intellectum apprehenditur ad occursum reisensatae ?10Cf. Fabre on the grey cricket.

5/21/2018 Garrigou-Lagrange de Eucharistia Qq. 73-82

14/22

[On q. 76, a. 5: Is Christs body in this sacrament as in aplace?]

|| p. 149 || Ad 3: The difficulty is this: to be in a place is areal accident of the body of Christ,therefore it ought to beconcomitantly present. The response is: To be in a place is a realacci-

dentnot an intrinsic one, however, but one by comparison to anextrinsic container, and not bya comparison to the very substanceof Christs body, which alone is present in virtue of itself in

the Eucharist.

* * *

[On q. 76, a. 6: Is Christs body in this sacrament movably?]

|| p. 150 || After the explanation of the preceding articles,there is no need to linger much overthis one. Thomas responds:Speakingper se, the body of Christ is not movably in thissacrament,

but in a sense he is there movablyper accidens, as is said inthe reply ad 1.

The first reason is that to beper se moved in place includes tobe in place, or to quit one placeand arrive at another. Christ,however, is not in the Eucharist as in a place. Therefore, etc.

The second reason is that to be moved in place per accidens isto be moved not in virtue of one-

self, but at the motion of another, as the rational soul ismovedper accidens when our bodymovesper se. In this way,peraccidens, the body of Christ is moved when the consecrated host

isper se moved from place to place, e.g., when it is elevated,when it is carried in processions andto the sick. And yet it ismoved moreper accidens than a man sitting in a ship under sail,becausethe body of Christ lacks extension in place, which thesailor has, who is in the boat as in a place.

In the body of the article as well as in the replies ad 2 and ad3, St. Thomas shows also that the

body of Christ is notper se moved when it ceases to be presentowing to the corruption of theappearances. The reason is that thebody of Christ thus present is a glorious incorruptible body,

and the cessation of its presence supposes only a change in thevery appearances of the bread andwine, which [appearances] arecorrupted. By the very fact that they are not any more theappear-

ances of bread and wine, their relationship to the substance ofChrists body ceases, just as theirrelationship to the substance ofbread would have ceased, if it had remained this substance.Insomewhat the same way, when beings are corrupted, God is nolonger present in them by the

presence of immensity, yet without any change in God himself.Hence notper sebut onlyperaccidens does the body of Christ cease tobe present under the appearances, namely, upon the lossof theappearances.

To the third, St. Thomas says: When they cease, Christs bodyceases to be under them, not b e-cause it depends on them, butbecause the relation which Christs body has to those appearancesisdestroyed. And in this way God ceases to be the Lord of a creaturewhich fails. This relation

[habitudo] between the body of Christ and the appearances is nota real relation but one of reason,even as that between God and thecreatures of which he is Lord is not a real relation but one of

reason. On the contrary, the relation of the appearances to thebody of Christ is real, just as therelation of creatures toGod.

Further passages to translate:

* pp. 124125 about precision in theological terminology

* pp. 12627 on the conditions for speaking correctly abouttransubstantiation

* pp. 148150, worth translating

5/21/2018 Garrigou-Lagrange de Eucharistia Qq. 73-82

15/22

[QUESTION 77]

|| p. 156 || . . . On the supposition, then, that the accidentsof bread and wine remain, many thingsare inquired about them, asregards their being and as regards their acting and undergoing.Thus

there are two sections in this question: the first section, asregards their being, contains the firsttwo articles, whether theaccidents remain without a subject, and whether dimensive quantityis

the subject of the other accidents; the second section, asregards their acting and undergoing, con-tains the other articles:whether they can nourish, whether they can be corrupted, andwhether

from them something else can be produced. In this, many are thethings to be marvelled at, whichare explained only with difficulty,and which are, so to speak, the invisible consequences ofthemiracle of transubstantiation. It should be noticed that it isnot to be wondered at if, for our lowly

intellect, there should remain obscurity in this matter, and yetthat this obscurity does not destroyour certainty concerning thereal presence and transubstantiation; for our certainty is notfounded

upon what we can understand, but upon a different sourcenamely,revelation, according to theliteral sense of Scripture and theinfallible explanation of the Church. In this Sacrament, asindiverse mysteries, there is enough clarity for those who wish tobelieve, and enough obscurity for

those who do not wish to believe. It is a chiaroscuro in which,if one negates what is clear on ac-count of what is obscure, inplace of the mystery, one sets down a contradiction in the verywords

of Christ instituting the Eucharist.

In this sense it is said: A thousand difficulties or obscuritiesdo not cause even one deliberatedoubt, if those difficulties do notdestroy the formal motive of certitude, which is, in thepresentcase, the authority of God revealing. Thus, too, in thenatural order obscurities concerning the

secret ways and means by which sensation is produced, or theabstraction of ideas from sensibles,do not destroy certitude aboutthe real existence of external bodies and their knowability.And

just as naturally we are certain about the existence of externalbodies, so we are certain about theexistence of the accidents ofbread remaining after consecration. Indeed, concerning them,our

natural certainty is bolstered by the infallible declaration ofthe Church. This is firmly to be held,against the Cartesianschool.

[Comment on q. 77, a. 1, ad 2]

|| p. 159 || . . . St. Thomas had already clearly applied thisdoctrine of the real distinction [betweenbeing and essence] to theeucharistic accidents in IV Sent., d. 12, q. 1, a. 1, qa. 1, ad 2where it is

said: In no created quiddity is to be or to exist an intrinsicor essential predicate. For this isproper to God alone. Iftherefore existence as such is not of the essence of created beingas such,

it follows that such existence (viz., to be in another) is notof the essence of such a being (viz., anaccident), but only anaptitude for such existence.

In addition, the present response rests upon the fundamentaldoctrine expounded in I, q. 104, a. 1:

creatures need to be conserved in being [esse] by God, becauseGod is not only the cause of thecoming to be, but also of thebeing, of all things. Thus, God, by conserving the eucharisticacci-dents, supplies them with the causality of substance. But, asCardinal Billot rightly points out

(De Sacra Eucharistia, in the comments on this article), Godsupplies not the material causalityof substance, but itsquasi-efficient causality, in so far, namely, as the accidents flowfrom it ac-

cording to a certain result. That is, God does not carry theburden in the place of a subject, buthaving removed the influx ofthe substance, whatever it be, he conserves the essence of theacci-dent under the being [esse] proper to it.

11

11Im not sure about the translation of these last couple ofsentences.Trans.

5/21/2018 Garrigou-Lagrange de Eucharistia Qq. 73-82

16/22

[Corollary to q. 77, a. 2]

|| p. 163 || By the arguments of this article, in the Eucharistthe connatural manner of existing thatbelongs to other accidents ispreserved, nor are miracles multiplied; but it suffices that [byone

miracle] quantity exist separate from substance. Hence, nochange in the other accidents occurs.[That is, they are stillsituated in their being as they normally are, namely dependent uponquanti-

ty, which in turn is normally dependent on substance for itsbeing, but in this case is miraculouslyvouchsafed being independentof substance.]

[Q. 77, a. 3]

|| p. 164 || . . . It is proved by a theological argument, inthe body of the article, as follows:

Anything acts in so far as it is in act, and determinessomething else according to its own prop-

er determination, for action follows being [operari sequituresse].

However, it is given to the sacramental appearances by divineintervention that they remain intheir being.

Therefore it follows that they remain also in their action.

That is: every action that was able to be exercised when thesubstance of bread and wine existed

can now be exercised [in its absence]. This is indeed mysteriousenough, but the major and minorpremises of the argument prevail,nor are they destroyed by the objections.

[Q. 77, a. 4]

|| p. 164 || Status of the question: This question is moredifficult than the question posed in the

preceding article, because God can carry the burden [or: take upthe role] of an absent efficientcause, but he cannot carry theburden of a material cause or a subject, for this would be animper-

fection in God, because matter is a passive potency,determinable and perfectible, whereas God is

pure act. . . .

The response is nevertheless that the sacramental appearancescan be corrupted and are in factcorrupted. This is not properlyspeaking a theological conclusion but more of an explanation of

what the senses establish.

|| p. 165 || . . . [W]hatever would have been able to corruptthe substance of bread and thus, inconsequence, destroy itsaccidents, can now, in the same way, destroy these accidents. . ..To the third, reply is made: The corruption of these appearancesis not miraculous, but natural.Yet it presupposes that theseappearances miraculously retain their being without a subject.Non-

etheless, there remains a difficulty, since the corruption ofone thing is the generation of another,which cannot occur withmatter [i.e., the subject of change]. This is the difficultyexamined in

the next article.

[Q. 77, a. 5]

|| p. 165 || Status of the question: It seems that nothing canbe generated from the sacramentalappearances, for (1) nothing isgenerated except out of matter, yet the sacramentalappearancesexist without matter, nor can God play the role ofmatter; (2) substance cannot be generated out of

an accident, which is of another genus. These objections areeasier to understand than the re-

5/21/2018 Garrigou-Lagrange de Eucharistia Qq. 73-82

17/22

sponse, because they skim the surface, while the response istaken from high above, namely, fromwhat almighty God can do in anextraordinary way.

|| p. 167 || . . . A difficulty still remains, namely: Whetherthe new thing composed [out of the ac-

cidents] consists only of quantity and substantial form, orwhether, on the contrary, God producesmatter out of whosepotentiality [the new thing is made], and in which the substantialform of the

new thing composed is received? This point is disputed amongThomists. Ferrara and certainothers hold that the newly composedthing is without matter, and that in it quantity substitutesfor

the place of matter . . . But more commonly Thomists, e.g., Johnof St. Thomas, Gonet, Billuart,hold that it is more probablyproduced out of new matter, for otherwise it would seem tofollowthat there would be a perpetual miracle continuing evenbeyond the Eucharist, for from the newly

composed thing, e.g., in the ashes, something else is generatedand so on, until the end of theworld.12 And a composite generatedfrom eucharistic appearances would not be a natural compo-

site.

|| p. 168 || [After noting how difficult it is to understandsuch matters, citing as examples theprocess of sensation and ofintellection, the local motion of bodies, and the reconciliation ofsee-mingly opposed divine attributes, Garrigou then comments:] Inall these things, as in the Euchar-

ist, it is necessary to distinguish well between a superiorobscurity which comes from too muchlight confronting the weaknessof our intellects, and an inferior obscurity which comes fromin-

coherence and even absurdity. Kant rejects supernaturalmysteries on account of their obscurity,yet in his doctrine thereis another obscurity, totally different, which does not come fromtoomuch light. It is not necessary to expend too much effort ofstudy on Kantianism, it would be a

great waste of time, time that could find a much more fruitfuluse for the salvation of souls. Thesame should be said ofCartesianism, whose feebleness is especially apparent in thefanciful and

labored theories [elucubrationibus] of the Cartesian theologiansconcerning the Eucharist, on ac-count of their confusion ofsubstance with local extension.

[Observation after Q. 77, a. 6]

|| p. 169 || In regard to these questions, something should benoted which pertains to the ascent orupward climb of matter[ascensum]. Following Aristotle, St. Thomas says many times thatmat-ter, which is naturally ordered to form, desires form, naymore, that it progressively desires a su-

perior form, as the matter of an element desires the form of aplant, and afterward, the form of a

brute animal, e.g., a cow, and afterward the form of a man,which is the most excellent of allforms that are received intomatter. Thus is the wondrous ascent of matter to what is superior,for

the sake of supporting and serving our understanding and ourlove of God. In the supernaturalorder, however, some part of matteris united to the soul of Christ, which is personally united totheWord, and the matter and form of bread are converted into theglorified body of Christ; therecannot be a higher ascent of matter.All these things are certain; the former are [known to be]certainon account of reasoning, the latter on account of faith.

These certainties are in no way lessened owing to the aforesaidobscurity, such as: how can a new

composite be generated from the corruption of the mereappearances of the Eucharist? God in amanner pleasing to Himproduces new matter either through an invisible creation, orbetter,

through an invisible conversion of the quantity of bread intothe substance of the thing newlycomposed; this conversion would bea consequence [sequela] of transubstantiation, and a conse-

12In other words, it would be miraculous that bodily substancecould be generated from a quantity without

matter, and if this occurred, then in the resulting bodysomething would be existing miraculously, and when

from thatbody another was generated, the miracle would be, so tospeak, passed on down the linea non-

stop miracle until the end of time.

5/21/2018 Garrigou-Lagrange de Eucharistia Qq. 73-82

18/22

quence that arises according to this law: the corruption of oneis the generation of another. ForGod, the creator and preserver ofmatter, has immediate power over it.

[Corollary to Q. 77, a. 8]

The real presence of the blood of Christ either ceases or doesnot cease in so far as there is made

or not made so great an admixture of additional liquid that theappearances or qualities of wine donot remain, so great, that is,that the substance of wine would itself have ceased, had itbeen

present. When exactly the substance of wine would cease to existfrom the admixture of anotherliquid it is difficult to determineconcretely, but knowledge [scientia] is not had of suchsingularthings, which are contigents; as if one were to seekexactly when grains of sand began to consti-tute a mound, for amound is something accidental, and has no determinate essence.Sophistsmultiply similar questions, which fall outsideknowledge.

[Recapitulation of Question 77]

1. After transubstantiation, these accidents remain without aproper subject, this is de fide; more-over, they remain without anysubject whatsoever, as is commonly held.

2. The dimensive quantity of the bread is the subject of theother accidents, e.g., color, resistance,taste.

3. Because these accidents remain, by divine power, in theirbeing, they also remain in their ac-tion, and thus they bring aboutchange in external bodies.

4. These accidents can be corrupted bothper se, namely, byreason of an accidental alteration,andper accidens, namely throughany action that would have destroyed the very substance of

bread [were it still there].

5. Out of these accidents, something can be generated, in so faras the quantity plays the role of[or: substitutes for, vices gerit]substance, and in turn matter is produced by God in thegenerated

composite, through a miracle coming out of transubstantiationitself [per miraculum subsequensex transsubstantiatione].

6. In this way, the sacramental appearances are able to nourish[the one who receives them].

These are the chief points of this question.

If these articles of St. Thomas on transubstantiation and theeucharistic accidents are comparedwith the writings of theologianspreceding or contemporary with him, the great step forward be-comesapparent. Biographers narrate that St. Thomas asked the Lord inprayer if this teaching on

the eucharistic accidents were true; apparently he obtained fromHim the following response:You have written well of me, Thomas[Bene scripsisti de me, Thoma].

Here ends the questions pertaining to theMATTER of theEucharist, which were four in number: q.74, on the type of matter;q. 75, on the conversion of bread and wine into the body and bloodofChrist; q. 76, on the manner in which Christ exists in thissacrament; q. 77, on the accidents of

bread and wine that remain in this sacrament. Now we go overinto q. 78, on theFORM of thissacrament.

5/21/2018 Garrigou-Lagrange de Eucharistia Qq. 73-82

19/22

[On ST III, q. 78: The form of the Eucharist]

|| p. 172 || . . . It is clear that the questions that havearisen between Catholics and schismaticsconcerning the form ofconsecration and the epiclesis may only now be treated, thequestions of

the real presence and of transubstantiation beingpresupposed.

To begin with, we have before our eyes definitions of theChurch. The Church has declared thatthe form of this sacrament arethe words of Christ, not the epiclesis (the subsequent prayer, asthe

Greeks call it). Cf. Denz. 414, 698, 715, 876, 938, 3043,3035.13

The Council of Florence (D.698) says: The form of this sacramentare the Saviors words, with which he confected this sa-crament; thepriest then speaking in persona Christi, confects this sacrament.For by the power ofthose words the substance of bread is convertedinto the body of Christ, and the substance of wineinto His blood. .. . The Council of Trent (D. 876) says: By the force of the words[of consecra-

tion], the body of Christ is under the appearance of bread andthe blood under the appearance ofwine. [See also D. 938 and 949.]Innocent IV, in the year 1254, concerning the Greek rite, dec-

lares: The Greeks should be permitted to celebrate Masses at thehour which is according to theirown custom, provided that theyobserve, in the confection or consecration, the very words ex-

pressed and handed down by the Lord (D. 3043.14) In fact, PiusX, in the year 1910 (D. 3035),

condemning doctrine recently defended, declares against certainerrors of the Orientals: [in brief,consecration is effected by thewords of consecration, not by the epiclesis, which is notstrictly

necessary]. Denziger notes here that many earlier popes havedeclared that the epiclesis is notrequired for consecration, namelyBenedict XII (D. 532), Clement VI, Benedict XIII, BenedictXIV andPius VII.

From the fourteenth century on, schismatic Greeks say that theEucharist is confected by theprayers which are poured out after thewords This is my body, This is my blood have been pro-nounced,according to their liturgical prayers as follows: We beseech you,Father, that you send

Your spirit over us and over these gifts set before us, and makethis bread the precious body ofyour Son and that which is in thechalice the precious blood of your Son. To say that this prayer

is necessary for consecration is to affirm that the Massescelebrated in the Roman Church are

invalid and is, moreover, contrary to the declaration of theCouncil of Florence (D. 698 and 715).The chief proponents of thiserror were Cabasilas, Mark of Ephesus, and Simeon ofThessalonica,

who were refuted by Cardinal Bessarion in his workDeEucharistia, as well as by Allatius andArcudius. (Cf.Dict. Thol.Cath., s. v. Epiclse,

P. Salaville.) According to Dom Cabrol, in the most ancientliturgies, the epiclesispreceded theconsecratory words, hence nodifficulty.15

There is a twofold explanation of the meaning of the epiclesisafter the words of consecration. ||p. 174 || (1) One explanationis: When it is read after the consecration, as it now is [in theGreekrite], the epiclesis invokes the Holy Spirit, not to effecttransubstantiation, which is already ac-complished, that is, not sothat the bread become the body of Christ, but that it may becomethis

for us, namely, that it may profit the priest and the faithful,especially those who are going to re-

13[Check these numbers against a more recent edition ofDenziger-Schnmetzer.Trans.]14[Check this translation.]15The falsityof the opinion of the schismatic Greeks is shown from SacredScripture and Tradition. For it

is not possible that the Evangelists and St. Paul, in referringto the words of Christ by which the Eucharist

was instituted and saying Do this in memory of me, would haveomitted words altogether necessary for a

valid consecration. Moreover, many Fathers, even Greek ones,assign as the cause of the conversion of

bread into the body of Christ, the words related in theSynoptics and by St Paul, without any others [added].

And not one among the Fathers insinuates that these words do notsuffice. Moreover, even among the

schismatic Greeks this error was unknown prior to the fourteenthcentury. (Garrigou)

5/21/2018 Garrigou-Lagrange de Eucharistia Qq. 73-82

20/22

ceive communion. In this way speak Vasquez, Bellarmine, Suarez,de Lugo, Billuart, and amongthe recent authors, Billot. But thisexplanation doesnt seem literal enough [i.e., it doesnt ac-

count for the seemingly obvious meaning of the prayer].

(2) The second explanation, which is more common, was proposedby Cardinal Bessarion, as fol-lows. The epiclesis invokes the HolySpirit exactly inasmuch as the consecration, being a work

ad extra, is common to the three divine Persons, and accordinglythe Holy Spirit is invoked, sothat, with the Father and the Sonalready having been invoked, He Himself [in unity with them]

may bring about transubstantiation. Indeed, thistransubstantiation is accomplished in an instant,by the words ofconsecration already pronounced; but because, by our human speech,all thesethings cannot be expressed in one and the same instant,things which are completed in an instant

are declared one after another. In this way speak Bessarion,Bossuet, Ferraris, Cagin, Franzelin,Salaville.16

[From Ott, Fundamentals, 39293]

THE FORM OF THE EUCHARIST CONSISTS IN CHRISTS WORDS OFINSTITUTION,UTTERED AT THE CON-

SECRATION. (SENT.CERTA.)

While the Greek-Orthodox Church wrongly placed the power oftransmutation either in the Epi-clesis alone, following after thenarrative of the institution, or in the connection of the wordsof

institution with the Epiclesis (Confessio orth. I 107), theCatholic Church adheres firmly to theview that the priestconsummates the transubstantiation solely by the uttering of thewords of in-stitution. [Ott then cites theDecretum pro Armenis ofFlorence and the parallel passage of Trent,and makes an argumentfrom the Gospel narrative. He then cites explicit testimonies fromTertul-lian, Justin Martyr, Ambrose, and John Chrysostom, withimplicit testimonies from Irenaeus and

Origen. The words of Chrysostom are particularly noteworthy: Thepriest stands there and setsup the outward sign, while speakingthese words; but the power and the grace are of God. Thisis mybody, he says. These words transmute the gifts (De proditioneJudae, Hom. I 6).]

In agreement with Cardinal Bessarion, the words of the Epiclesisare to be taken as referring, not

to the time at which they are spoken, but to the time to whichthey are related. That which hap-pens in one single moment in theconsecration, is liturgically developed and explained in thesub-sequent words of the Epiclesis. The Epiclesis has noconsecratory, but only a declaratory signi-ficance.

16Trans.: Later, Garrigou notes that a similar principle is atwork in the narrative of the Last Supper, whereJesus takes bread,blesses it, breaks it, and speaks the words. [N]arration issuccessive and announces

words after facts, when really the words spoken are simultaneouswith the facts.]

The reason why this kind of temporal disjunction happens is nothard to see . We humans can only

speak of an instantaneous coming-to-be in language of change andtherefore of time duration (consider all

the troubles Thomas has to face when speaking of creation exnihilo). Thus the liturgy speaks at length,

one might say, of the conversion of the giftsit calls down theSpirit, recalls or repeats the institu-

tion, offers up the gifts to the heavenly Father, and so onindifferent sequences for different ritesbut

really, these things are occurring simultaneously. This wecannot express with our time-bound language.

If angels had liturgies, they'd be able to do it.

5/21/2018 Garrigou-Lagrange de Eucharistia Qq. 73-82

21/22

21

On Question 79

After the consideration of this sacrament in itself and in itsparts, now are treated its effects, andafter that, in qu. 80, itsuse, or communion and the conditions prerequisite for this. Theseare

maximally vital questions pertaining to the interior life, ofhighest importance for everyone. Inthe present question there areeight articles, which may be grouped into four sections:

o

The first section (aa. 12) treat of the positive effects, namelythe increase of grace andthe attainment of glory, to which theEucharist, especially as viaticum, disposes one more

than any other sacrament;o

The second section (aa. 36) treat of the quasi-negative effects,which are the remissionof sin and punishment, and preservation fromfuture sin;

o The third section (a. 7) is whether this sacrament can benefitothers besides those who re-ceive it;

o The fourth section (a. 8) treats of the impediment to theeffects of this sacrament. Thislast article is the transition tothe following question, which concerns holy communion.

This question 79, attentively considered, is not only about theEucharist as a sacrament, but alsoabout the same as a sacrifice,for in art. 7 is shown that the Eucharist profits its recipients inthe

manner of both sacrament and sacrifice, while it profitsnon-recipients in the manner of a sacrifice[alone]. [It should alsobe noted that] the diverse effects of the Eucharist were expoundedwith

great piety by St. Thomas in his office for the BlessedSacrament. (One should also consult BookIV of The Imitation ofChrist.)

[cf. p. 190, on the bonum est diffusivum suiprinciple behind theEucharist.]

[After the commentary on q. 79:] Now is to be treated thecommunion itself, on our part, for aftera consideration of theeffects of the Eucharist, the matter next to be handled [q. 80] isthe requisiteconditions for receiving it on the part of therecipient.

On Question 80

In this question, there are twelve articles, which may begrouped into two sections:

o The first section (aa. 15) considers the use of the Eucharistaccording to itself [secun-dum se], in regard to the dispositionsrequired of necessity by the very nature of the sa-

crament;o The second section considers the use of the Eucharistin view of the divine precept and

the precepts of the Church, where the eucharistic fast,communion under both species orunder one alone, etc., are spokenof.

5/21/2018 Garrigou-Lagrange de Eucharistia Qq. 73-82

22/22

22

Divisio textusof ST III, q. 82:

On the Minister of the Eucharist

1)

Regarding priests who preside over the Eucharist [Or: To whomdoes it belong to presideover the Eucharist?]

a)

As regards consecration:

i) alone (art. 1) [Does the consecration of the Eucharistpertain only to a priest?]

ii) in company, i.e., concelebration (art. 2) [May severalpriests consecrate the same

host and chalice?]

b) As regards distribution

i)

to the faithful (art. 3) [Must the priest communicateothers?]

ii) to himself (art. 4) [Must the priest communicatehimself?]

2)

Regarding unworthypriests who preside over the Eucharist

a) The unworthy priest himself

i) The sinful priest, in general

(1) Can an evil priest consecrate? (art. 5)

(2) Is the Mass of an evil priest as powerful as that of a goodpriest? (art. 6)

ii) Particular cases of sinful priests

(1)

Can an heretical, schismatic, or excommunicated priestconsecrate? (art. 7)

(2) Can a demoted priest consecrate? (art. 8)

b) Those who communicate from an unworthy priest (art. 9)

3)

Regarding the necessity of an individual priests offering Mass(art. 10)

Garrigous division is a bit different:

1) Of the minister of consecration [aa. 1 & 2]

2)

Of the minister of dispensation [a. 3]3) Of the relationshipbetween the communion of the priest and the consecration [a. 4]

4)

Of any priests obligation of celebrating [a. 5]

5)

Of the requisite conditions for a priest to consecrate licitly:state of grace, faith, not excommunicated

[aa. 68]

6)

Then is sought whether those who receive communion from anunworthy minister sin [a. 9];

7)

Finally is sought whether a priest may licitly refrainaltogether from celebrating [a. 10]